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Abstract—In general, a botnet is a collection of compromised
internet computers, controlled by attackers for malicious pur-
poses. To increase attacks’ success chance and resilience against
defence mechanisms, modern botnets have often a decentralized
P2P structure. Here, IoT devices are playing a critical role,
becoming one of the major tools for malicious parties to per-
form attacks. Notable examples are DDoS attacks on Krebs on
Security1 and DYN2, which have been performed by IoT devices
part of botnets.
We take a first step towards detecting P2P botnets in IoT, by
proposing AutoBotCatcher, whose design is driven by the con-
sideration that bots of the same botnet frequently communicate
with each other and form communities. As such, the purpose of
AutoBotCatcher is to dynamically analyze communities of IoT
devices, formed according to their network traffic flows, to detect
botnets. AutoBotCatcher exploits a permissioned Byzantine Fault
Tolerant (BFT) blockchain, as a state transition machine that
allows collaboration of a set of pre-identified parties without
trust, in order to perform collaborative and dynamic botnet
detection by collecting and auditing IoT devices’ network traffic
flows as blockchain transactions.
In this paper, we focus on the design of the AutoBotCatcher
by first defining the blockchain structure underlying AutoBot-
Catcher, then discussing its components.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT), Security,
P2P Botnets, Botnet Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT technology has been growing chaotically on many
environments, such as homes and factories [1], connecting
exceptionally large number of devices, expected to increase up
to 130 billion devices in 2030.3 Yet, this increasing popularity
has made IoT devices a powerful amplifying platform for
cyberattacks [2]. In fact, IoT devices are often simple products
that due to the limits of available constrained-resources do
not take security as primary goal. As such, they represent
a rather easy target to attackers and the weakest link in the
security chain of modern computer networks [2]. As proof of
this, a recent study from HP found that more than 70% of
IoT devices do not have passwords with sufficient complexity
and use unencrypted network services, resulting in being easy
targets for attackers.4
In such a vulnerable environment, attackers can easily gain
access to insecure IoT devices, and inject malicious softwares,
malware, to control them or to steal confidential information
1krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos
2dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack
3cdn.ihs.com/www/pdf/IoT_ebook.pdf
4go.saas.hpe.com/l/28912/2015-07-21/32bhy3/28912/69168/IoT_Report.
pdf
[3]. Today, one of the most relevant threat posed by malware
in IoT is represented by malicious botnets.5 A botnet is a
collection of compromised internet computers being controlled
remotely by attackers for malicious and illegal purposes [4].
For example, some recent Distributed Denial of Services
(DDoS) attacks on Krebs on Security and DYN were due to
malware named Mirai [5], that uses IoT devices as botnets
to generate extensive amount of network traffic, more than 1
Tbps. Additionally, such botnets have been commoditized by
malicious parties, known as booters [6], that offers DDoS as
a service. Booters exploit compromised IoT devices to send
attack packets to a target victim, in order to interrupt its service
or shut it down. Given that, botnets capable of using tens of
thousands of IoT devices pose huge threats to online services’
security and privacy.
Botnets. Let us examine in more details the main elements
of botnets. Briefly, a typical botnet consists of [4]: i) several
bots, that is, infected machines running the bot executable;
ii) a Command and Control (C&C) server, able to control
every bot; and iii) a botmaster, which is the malicious party
controlling the botnet via the C&C server. Early botnets fol-
lowed a centralized architecture, where the botmaster manages
bots via the central C&C server. To increase resilience of
their attacks against defence mechanisms, more recent botnet
architectures evolved into decentralized P2P architectures.
Today, decentralized P2P botnet topologies are able to utilize
regular bots as C&C servers [4], thus eliminating the single
point of failure problem. On the other hand, this makes P2P
botnets harder to being detected and stopped, as botmasters
are able to send attack commands through various channels.
AutoBotCatcher. The design of AutoBotCatcher is driven
by the consideration that bots of a same botnet frequently
communicate with each other and form communities [7], [8].
As such, the purpose of AutoBotCatcher is to dynamically
analyze communities of IoT devices, formed according to their
network traffic flow (see problem statement in Section II),
to detect botnets. Specifically, it is a blockchain-based P2P
botnet detection mechanism for IoT that makes use of two
main actors, namely: agents and block generators (see Section
II for more details). Where, agents are entitled to monitor
IoT network traffic flows in their subnets, and send collected
traffic information as blockchain transactions. In contrast, by
using collected network traffic flows, block generators (i.e.,
trusted big entities in IoT domain) aim at modeling mutual
5For the rest of paper, we use the term botnet to refer malicious botnets.
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contact information of IoT devices (i.e., connections between
IoT devices) and generating mutual contacts graph. This graph
is then exploited to detect communities (see Section III-A).
In particular, AutoBotCatcher uses Louvain method [9]
to perform community detection on mutual contacts graphs.
Since mutual contact information of IoT devices evolves
over time, new snapshots of the mutual contacts graph are
periodically generated. To this end, AutoBotCatcher exploits
states of a BFT blockchain in order to store snapshots of
the mutual contacts graph (see Section IV). AutoBotCatcher’s
BFT blockchain is a permissioned blockchain, where a set of
pre-identified block generators generate blocks and participate
in the consensus process (see Section III-C). Thus, network
data stored on the blockchain is only accessible to block
generators.
Why blockchain? To enable multiple parties to collaborate
for botnet detection, we chose to use blockchain rather than a
centralized system given the benefits blockchain might bring.
Thanks to its distributed consensus protocol6, blockchain
platform does not require a central trusted party to validate
the correct execution of the collaborative process (aka botnet
detection), and ensure transparency on collected snapshots of
communities of IoT devices overcoming the possible lack of
trust among parties involved in the botnet detection (see Sec-
tion III-C). Moreover, as a state transition machine, blockchain
lets us model the whole botnet detection process as a set of
shared application states (aka states of parties collaborating in
the botnet detection). This allows AutoBotCatcher to perform
dynamic and collaborative botnet detection on large number
of IoT devices.
Contributions. The main contributions described in this
paper can be summarized as follows:
? a first blockchain-based botnet detection architecture for IoT;
? dynamic and collaborative approach for botnet detection and
prevention;
? dynamic community detection with the help of blockchain
technology.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we present the considered problem
statement and the main entities involved in AutoBotCatcher.
We provide background information on blockchain technology,
mutual contacts graph, and community detection approaches
in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce the blockchain
paradigm defined for AutoBotCatcher. We detail the design
of AutoBotCatcher in Section V. Section VI discusses related
work, whereas Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the problem statement and the
main entities of AutoBotCatcher.
Problem Statement. We assume to have a network of IoT
devices, gateways, and some external hosts that communicate
with IoT devices (such as device vendors’ servers, cloud
6With the assumption that more than two-thirds of the block generators
are honest.
services). IoT devices are connected to the internet, they sense
and process data, and communicate with other IoT devices or
external hosts. Botmasters compromise IoT devices and make
them part of their botnets for malicious purposes, such as
performing DDoS attacks. On the other hand, gateways, such
as Dell Edge Gateways7, are located in network boundaries
and monitor the internet traffic to/from IoT devices within
their networks, referred to as their subnet. We assume that
gateways are secure and trusted devices, as such, they behave
as expected, and cannot be compromised by botmasters.
AutoBotCatcher targets P2P botnets, where all bots po-
tentially can be utilized as C&C servers by botmasters, and
performs community analysis on network traffic flows of
IoT devices to detect botnet communities. We assume that a
botnet community is a group of compromised IoT devices that
frequently communicate with each other and with the same
set of botmasters. AutoBotCatcher relies on mutual contacts
information of IoT devices, which refers to shared connections
between a pair of IoT devices and/or other hosts. For example,
let us assume Host A8 is connected to Host C; given that, if
Host B is also connected to Host C then Host A and Host B
share a mutual contact, that is, Host C. As discussed in [7]
and [8], bots of a P2P botnet communicate with at least one
mutual contact with very high probability, therefore mutual
contacts can be exploited for botnet detection [7]. Given that,
AutoBotCatcher exploits mutual contact information of IoT
devices in performing botnet community analysis (see Section
V).
Our assumptions on the threat model are as follows: IoT
devices can become part of a botnet anytime; new types
of botnets may emerge in the network; botmasters encrypt
C&C channels, and therefore DPI techniques are not suitable;
botnets tend to hide their operations and botmasters try to
stay as stealthy as possible [4], where botnets are able to
manipulate characteristics of bot traffic, and thus they are
able to make network flow traffic signature based defense
approaches ineffective; botnets are in their waiting stage,
where bots are joined to the C&C network and wait for
commands from the botmaster, thus their malicious activity
may not be easily observable. The goal of AutoBotCatcher
is to dynamically identify IoT devices and other hosts in the
network that are part of botnets.
Entities. AutoBotCatcher consists of two main entity types:
– Agents: They are typically gateway devices that are
deployed in the network boundaries. AutoBotCatcher’s agents
monitor network traffic flows of IoT devices in their subnet
and take actions, such as: generating network-data transactions
(NTs) (see Definition 1) and forcing infected devices to shut
down. In AutoBotCatcher agents are considered trusted and
honest.
– Block Generators: This role is played by big entities in
IoT, such as device vendors, internet service providers (ISPs),
security/privacy regulators. We assume that such big entities
7dell.com/us/business/p/edge-gateway
8Here, Host refers to both IoT devices and other hosts in the network.
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devote enough computing and network resources to take block
generator role in P2P botnet detection process (see Section V).
For effective botnet detection and prevention, collaboration
of different device vendors and ISPs is very important, as
recent IoT botnets, such as Mirai and Hajime, infected IoT
products from various vendors.9 In fact, malware behind those
botnets are adaptable to the various device architectures, such
as ARM and Intel, and to different products, and they were
effective in all around the world. Therefore, block generators
collaborate to achieve large-scale defense and protection from
botnet threat without trusting each other with the help of a
permissioned BFT blockchain. We assume that block gener-
ators have enough computing, storage and network resources
available to devote to P2P botnet detection process operations
using blockchain (see Section V).
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background information needed
to understand the rest of the paper. To this end, first, we
explain the mutual contacts graph concept; then, we provide
an overview of community detection approaches; and, finally,
we briefly describe blockchain technology.
A. Mutual Contacts Graph
In AutoBotCatcher, mutual contacts graphs are exploited
as a graph based data representation of the mutual contacts
of IoT devices and other hosts in the network. We denote a
mutual contacts graph as G = (V,E), where IP addresses of
IoT devices and other hosts are vertices (V ). Vertices share an
edge (E), if they have at least one mutual contact. Edges are
bidirectional and weighted, where number of mutual contacts
between vertices is the weight of the edge between them. As
such, by referring to the example of mutual contacts given in
Section II and assuming that there are only three hosts in the
network, Hosts A, B, C are vertices in the mutual contacts
graph, where Host A and Host B share an edge with weight 1,
as they share the mutual contact Host C. In AutoBotCatcher,
the whole topology of the mutual contacts graph is represented
by a 2 dimensional weighted adjacency matrix, referred to
as mutual contacts matrix (MCM), whose element MCMij
indicates the number of mutual contacts between vertices i
and j.
B. Community Detection
Bots of the same botnet use similar C&C channels and share
the same messages [8], [10], as such they are much likely
to share many mutual contacts [7] than legitimate P2P hosts.
Therefore, P2P bots show community behaviours and form
community structures that can be useful for botnet detection.
Given that, AutoBotCatcher performs community analysis on
mutual contacts graphs.
Community detection methodology. In AutoBotCatcher,
accurate and fast detection of communities in the mutual con-
tacts graph is of great importance for proper botnet detection.
9symantec.com/connect/blogs/hajime-worm-battles-mirai-control-
internet-things
Literature offers several community detection approaches for
systems modeled as graphs (see [11] for more details). The
main objective of these methods is to find good partitions on
the graphs as possible communities in the network. How to
measure goodness of a partition is an important concern in
designing community detection methods. In general, a quality
function is used as a quantitative criterion that assigns a
number to each partition of a graph to rank partitions based
on their score [11]. Notably, modularity is the most popular
quality function, where achieving high modularity translates to
a better partition of the graph, thus better community structure
(for further discussion on the methodology please refer to
[12]). Given that, AutoBotCatcher exploits a modularity-based
Louvain method [9], that is, an hierarchical greedy algorithm
trying to improve modularity for community detection.10 Lou-
vain method has many advantages that makes it a good choice
for AutoBotCatcher, such as: it is faster and achieves higher
modularity than other methods; and it is able to process large
networks in a short time.11
C. Blockchain
Blockchain relies on the concept of a distributed ledger
maintained by a peer-to-peer network [13]. Novelty of the
blockchain technology lies in its ability to achieve coordination
and verification of individual activities carried out by different
parties without a centralized authority or trusted third party,
that allows decentralization of application execution with
concerted and autonomous operations [14]. In blockchain,
transactions transfer information (i.e., data packets) between
peers. They have a unique identifier (transaction-id), input
data, and are bundled into data chunks, referred to as blocks.
Block generator peers of the blockchain broadcast blocks by
exploiting public-key cryptography. Blocks are recorded in the
blockchain with an exact order. Briefly, a block contains: a
set of transactions; a timestamp; a reference to the preceding
block that identifies the block’s place in the blockchain; an
authenticated data structure (e.g., a Merkle tree) to ensure
block integrity.12
As a state transition machine, different participants in the
blockchain have to achieve consensus on the latest state of the
ledger in order to achieve coordination on the processes that
they perform on the ledger. There are different methodologies
to achieve consensus in the blockchain. For example, some
blockchains use Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) methodologies
that depend on state replication between block generators;
other use Proof of Work (PoW), where block generators have
to use their hardware resources and energy to generate a block
by solving a cryptographic puzzle; while others use Proof of
Stake (PoS), where block generator selection depends on part
of peers’ wealth that they have voted as their stake in the
10Despite initially being designed for unweighted graphs, it can be easily
adapted to weighted ones.
11It took 12 minutes for a network containing 39 million vertices and 783
million edges [9] with AMD dual opteron 2.2k, 24 GB of RAM.
12Block structure varies in different blockchain protocols, here we list the
most common elements.
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block generator selection process. Notably, BFT blockchains
can maintain a relative high throughput. For example, BFT
Tendermint consensus protocol [15] is able to process thou-
sands of transactions per second. Generally, BFT blockchains
can scale to dozens or few hundreds of block generators.
Blockchains can be classified into two groups as public
and permissioned according to their way of regulating peers’
participation in blockchain operations. Particularly, in public
blockchains, any peer can read and write to the blockchain,
meaning that anyone can participate in the consensus process.
Whereas, in permissioned blockchains, only a set of previously
identified peers can write to the blockchain and participate in
the consensus and access to the stored transactions.
In AutoBotCatcher, we exploit a BFT blockchain in per-
missioned setting for processing network traffic flow data for
botnet community detection. Permissioned BFT blockchain is
adequate for AutoBotCatcher setting, since its design is based
on assigning the block generator role to relatively small set of
actors such as device vendors, internet service providers etc.
Moreover, AutoBotCatcher exploits states of a BFT blockchain
in performing dynamic botnet community detection process,
as discussed in the following section. Finally, in permissioned
blockchain setting stored network data kept confidential from
unknown parties as only a set of pre-identified block genera-
tors can access to network data stored in the blockchain.
IV. THE BLOCKCHAIN PARADIGM
We devote this section to explain how blockchain is used
in AutoBotCatcher.
Transactions. To detect botnets, AutoBotCatcher employs
community detection analysis on the mutual contacts graph. In
particular, to generate mutual contacts graphs, AutoBotCatcher
needs to collect and analyze meta-data information about
network traffic flow of IoT devices (i.e., IP addresses). To
this end, we exploit a permissioned blockchain as a shared
data store to audit meta-data, which are thus modelled as
blockchain transactions sent by agents to the blockchain’s
transaction pool, a shared data store hosted by all block
generators, that holds unprocessed transactions. Particularly,
each agent is connected to one block generator to send trans-
actions, where block generator that receives a new transaction
disseminates new transactions to other block generators.
Meta-data are encoded into network-data transaction (NT),
formally defined as follows:
Definition 1: Network-data Transaction (NT). Let
NetF low be the network traffic flow defined as NetF low =
(IPsrc, IPdest), where IPsrc and IPdest are the source’s
and destination’s IP addresses, respectively. Let Deviceaddr
be the unique public key of the agent that sends the
transaction, and let Tx − Pooladdr be the public key of
the transaction pool that agent is connected to send the
transaction, A network-data transaction is a tuple: NT =
〈Deviceaddr, IPsrc, IPdest, Tx− Pooladdr〉
Blocks. Transactions are bundled into blocks that are gen-
erated by block generators.13 In what follows, we symbolize
a block as bm, where m represents the block number. Given
that, the block structure is as follows:
bm = {NTx, . . . , NTy} (1)
Where, NT represents a network-data transaction, and x
and y are the transaction number. During the execution of
AutoBotCatcher, one of the block generators is elected as a
leader to generate a block. Block generation interval, symbol-
ized as τ , represents the amount of time between consecutive
block generations. Upon generation of a block, at least two-
thirds of block generators should send acknowledgements to
the block generator regarding their approval on the block.14
Once acknowledgements have been obtained and τ is expired,
block generator of the next block generates the new block.
Rounds. In AutoBotCatcher, P2P botnet analysis is period-
ically performed upon generation of a set of blocks. We refer
to such periods as rounds. Each round takes certain amount
of time, symbolized as ∆. Value of ∆ depends on both the
amount of time needed for block generators to perform botnet
detection operations on the blocks (e.g., mutual contacts graph
extraction, botnet community detection, etc.), network quality
(e.g., network connection delays), and blockchain protocol
(e.g., transaction throughput etc.). A round is symbolized as
Γ∆t , where ∆t is a timestamp specifying the starting time of
the round. When the round Γ∆t ends, the next round Γ∆t+1
starts. In round Γ∆t , botnet detection is performed on NTs sent
during the previous round Γ∆t−1 . More precisely, NTs sent
from timestamp ∆t−1 to timestamp ∆t (which corresponds to
execution time of round Γ∆t−1 ) are processed in round Γ∆t .
State. Fundamentally, blockchain consists of set of shared
states and performs state transition. In general, the state notion
can be used to represent financial balances of users (e.g.,
Bitcoin), or, in a broader setting, it can represent anything
that can be modeled as result of the computer programs (i.e.,
on Ethereum blockchain [16]). In our setting, the state is a
mapping between IoT devices’ and other hosts’ IP addresses
(that are subject to botnet detection) and communities (each
marked as botnet community or benign community). In Au-
toBotCatcher, similar to the Ethereum protocol [16], the state
is not stored on the blockchain, rather it is maintained on an
efficient Merkle tree implementation,15 such as Patricia Merkle
Trees.16 Merkle trees are hash based data structures, where
each node is the hash of its children or hash of the data, if the
node is a leaf. Main benefits of using Merkle trees to store
states are: they are immutable data structures, thus we are able
to secure entire system states with cryptographic dependences;
13Number of transactions in a block is regulated according to the block
size and transaction size settings of the blockchain protocol.
14If the block generator does not get approval from at least two-thirds of
block generators, that block will not be added to the blockchain, and a new
block generator will be selected to generate a block.
15Exploiting Merkle trees in our blockchain setting requires a simple state
database backend.
16github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Patricia-Tree
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and, they allow the blockchain protocol to trivially revert to
any old state by simply altering the root hash [16].
In AutoBotCatcher, the state of the blockchain on timestamp
∆t, symbolized as σ∆t , consists of: the snapshot of the latest
version of the mutual contacts graph G∆t , that is generated
from the network-data transactions; the set of all communities
and IP addresses of hosts associated with that communities,
extracted from the mutual contacts graph by block validators,
symbolized as CommSet∆t ; and, all blocks of the blockchain.
Given that, the state of the blockchain on timestamp ∆t is
represented as follows:
σ∆t = (G∆t , CommSet∆t , [B0, . . . , Bm]) (2)
In Figure 1, we present an example of rounds and states,
where each round includes generation of three blocks.
Figure 1: Round and state relation
State transitions. In blockchain, state transition refers to
achieving a new valid state after executing a set of transactions
on the previous state. AutoBotCatcher uses the community
set and snapshot of the mutual contacts graph of the previous
blockchain state to dynamically perform botnet community
detection. Therefore, in AutoBotCatcher, a state transition
occurs upon finishing a round of botnet detection operations
(see Section V for more details). Given that, for every round Γ
defined above, one state change occurs upon execution of the
set of blocks. Particularly, upon execution of round Γ∆t , the
state changes from σ∆t to σ∆t+1 which includes a new set of
processed blocks. We define the state transition as a function
of rounds, which takes previous state and new blocks as input,
as follows:
σ∆t+1 = Γ (σ∆t , [Bm, . . . , Bm+z]) (3)
Where σ∆t is the previous state (see Equation 2), and
[Bm, . . . , Bm+z] is the set of new blocks, where m and z
represent block number (see Equation 1).
Consensus. Blockchain protocol adopted by AutoBot-
Catcher uses Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) methodology to
achieve consensus in a permissioned setting. In BFT block-
chain, in order to achieve consensus, at least two-thirds of the
pre-identified block generators have to agree on the latest state
proposed by one of the block generators. In our setting, this
translates to agree on: the same set of blocks processed; same
mutual contacts graph; and same community mapping of IoT
devices.
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
AutoBotCatcher exploits a permissioned BFT blockchain
as a backend module to perform dynamic and collaborative
botnet detection on large scale networks. An overview of the
execution flow of AutoBotCatcher is presented in Figure 2 and
discussed in what follows.
Network data pre-processing. This task is executed by
agents for monitoring network traffic flow of IoT devices
and taking actions according to that. In performing such
operations, agents maintain two types of IP address lists,
namely blacklist and whitelist. Blacklists contain IP addresses
that have been previously detected as part of a botnet. On
the other hand, whitelists contain predefined and trusted IP
addresses,17 such as IP addresses of the vendor’s servers, for
all IoT devices in their subnet.
More precisely, an agent constantly sniffs network traffic
flows of IoT devices in its subnet; the agent does not take any
action for network traffic of an IoT device with a whitelisted
IP address; for all other network traffic flows, the agent forms
network flow transactions (NTs) (as given in Definition 1), if
a network flow is with a blacklisted IP address, then agent
quarantines that IoT device either by forcing it to shut down
or by cutting all of its network connections.
Blockchain operations. This task is executed by block gen-
erators for the generation and relay of blocks that include NTs.
To perform these operations in a round Γ∆t , first, one block
generator is selected to generate one or more blocks.18 That
block generator takes the subset of NTs from the blockchain
transaction pool, it forms a block and broadcasts the block to
all block generators. We recall that each block has to receive
approval from at least two-thirds of the block generators in
order to be valid, and to achieve consensus on its validity in
a BFT blockchain setting.
Graph extraction. This task is executed by block genera-
tors, aiming at elaborating the network traffic flow data, that is,
the NTs processed in a round Γ, to generate/update the mutual
contacts graph G. Particularly in round Γ∆t , block generators
create the mutual contacts matrix MCM∆t+1 , representing
G∆t+1 that results from the state σ∆t+1 , by updating MCM∆t ,
i.e., G∆t of state σ∆t , with the NTs in blocks sent from ∆t−1
to ∆t.
Operations to transit from MCM∆t to MCM∆t+1 are:
updating weights of edges between vertices that communicated
in round Γ∆t ; adding vertices and edges, if new IoT devices
connect to a device network, or a new host IP address com-
municates with an IoT device; removing vertices and edges,
if some IoT devices or hosts do not exist anymore.
Community detection. This task, executed by block gener-
ators, performs dynamic community discovery (DCD) on the
mutual contacts graph G.
17We assume that hosts corresponding to IP addresses in whitelists are
secure, and do not pose any threat to IoT devices.
18For the sake of brevity, we do not detail the election process, but any
leader election process performed in a typical distributed system is suitable
for our setting.
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Figure 2: AutoBotCatcher system flow
AutoBotCatcher performs dynamic community detection
with Louvain method on snapshots of the mutual contacts
graphs from consecutive states of the permissioned BFT
blockchain. Yet, as presented in [17], even small changes in
consecutive network snapshots may cause Louvain method
to generate two alike community structures, which would
eventually cause AutoBotCatcher to lose track of the com-
munities and thus degrade its execution. Therefore, to have a
more stable community structure between timestamps, Auto-
BotCatcher initializes the Louvain algorithm for community
detection at timestamp ∆t+1 with the communities found in
∆t as proposed by Aynaud et al. in [17]. More precisely,
in round Γ∆t , AutoBotCatcher performs community detection
on newly extracted mutual contacts graph G∆t+1 , by feeding
community set of IoT devices, CommSet∆t from the last
state δ∆t to Louvain method.
Perturbation check. This task is performed by block
generators to check updates (i.e., IP address additions and
removals) on communities that already exist in the previous
timestamp.19 Particularly, for botnet communities, IP addresses
of new bots are inserted to the list called additions to blacklist,
whereas IP addresses of bots that are no longer part of a botnet
are inserted to the list called removals from blacklist. Upon
block generators achieve consensus on the new state, block
generators share those lists with agents (see task bot identifier).
Botnet check. Executed by block generators, this task is
responsible for classifying new communities as either botnet
or benign communities. Botnet detection methodology used
by AutoBotCatcher is based on two observations: 1) bots
connect with each other for command exchange, thus they
have more mutual contacts than benign communities [8]; 2)
botmasters or attack targets communicate with many nodes,
referred to as pivotal nodes [18], so that they have very high
number of mutual contacts. Therefore, according to the first
observation, AutoBotCatcher calculates the average number
19If a community changes more than a threshold φ, calculated as the ratio
of total changes to number of edges and vertices, that community will be
considered as a new community, and next task will be executed on it.
of mutual contacts per IP address for all communities. If the
result is higher than a pre-defined mutual contacts threshold
θ, that community is marked as candidate botnet community.
Secondly, AutoBotCatcher checks for pivotal nodes in can-
didate botnet communities. Particularly, for all IP addresses
in a candidate botnet community, AutoBotCatcher sums their
rows in the mutual contacts matrix (MCM). If one or more
pivotal nodes exists in the candidate botnet community, it is
marked as botnet community by the block generator. Upon
block generators achieve consensus on the new state, block
generators share IP addresses in botnet communities with next
task for bot blacklisting.
Identify bots. The last task is responsible for updating the
bot blacklists of agents, and it is executed by block generators
after a state change. It updates the blacklists of all IoT devices
with the help of smart contract transactions for addition and
deletion of IP addresses on agent’s local blacklists.20
VI. RELATED WORK
In recent years, vast amounts of work has been devoted
to P2P botnet detection. In general, botnet detection method-
ologies can be categorized into two groups: host-based and
network-based approaches. Host-based approaches require the
monitoring of all hosts, which is impractical for the IoT
domain. Therefore, we focus on network-based approaches,
which in turn can be classified into two groups:
– Network traffic signature based approaches. Literature
offers many works that classify hosts based on their network
traffic behaviour. In general, these approaches exploit super-
vised/unsupervised machine learning techniques to identify
whether hosts are benign or malicious [19]–[27]. However, in
a dynamic network, botmasters can randomize botnet traffic
by changing communication frequency, packet sizes, etc. As
such, network traffic signatures learned by machine learning
approaches may not be robust enough to identify bots [10],
which would eventually make such approaches ineffective.
20As it is not the main focus of our work, we do not detail how this
mechanism works, such as transaction structure, which is left as future work.
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Moreover, some of the proposed approaches, such as [19],
[26], rely on deep packet inspection techniques (DPI) to
analyze network packet contents. However, these checks can
be bypassed through encryption of C&C channels. Given that,
we conclude that network traffic signature based approaches
are not suitable for dynamic and evolving IoT environments.
– Group and community behavior based approaches. Some
works use group and community behaviour analysis for botnet
detection [7], [8], [10]. As an example, similarly to us, [7]
exploits mutual contacts extracted from network traffic flow
of hosts, in order to identify bots in a P2P network. Whereas
[10] performs group level behavior analysis on network traffic
flow with Support Vector Machine (SVM). However, these
approaches are able to detect only previously known bot types.
Therefore, they are not suitable for IoT, where new botnets
emerge frequently [2]. Differently, PeerHunter [8] exploits
Louvain method to perform network flow level community
behaviour analysis on mutual contacts graph, without relying
on previously known bot types. Yet, PeerHunter performs
static botnet detection on the collected network traffic flow
data, which is inadequate for a dynamic and evolving IoT
environment that requires dynamic botnet detection.
AutoBotCatcher differs from the previously discussed ap-
proaches in several ways. First, unlike DPI based approaches,
to perform botnet detection AutoBotCatcher requires to trace
only high level meta-data about network flow traffic (i.e.,
source and destination addresses), as such it is effective against
encrypted C&C channels. Second, unlike network traffic signa-
ture based approaches, even if botmasters randomize network
traffic by changing packet sizes, communication frequency
etc., botnet community structures do not alter, since the same
set of commands has to be shared with the same set of bots.
Third, unlike other group and community behaviour based
approaches, AutoBotCatcher performs dynamic community
detection by exploiting blockchain, so it is able to detect
emerging and unknown botnets, and to take preventive mea-
sures against them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduce a blockchain based dynamic P2P
botnet detection and prevention mechanism for IoT, referred
to as AutoBotCatcher, that performs community detection on
network flows of IoT devices. In AutoBotCatcher, IoT gateway
devices become peers of a BFT blockchain, where device
vendors and/or security regulators take the block generator
role and participate in the consensus process. Blockchain is
exploited to perform dynamic network based botnet commu-
nity detection on snapshots of the mutual contact graph of IoT
devices.
Future work includes: implementing AutoBotCatcher by
leveraging on BFT based Hyperledger blockchain21 and ex-
ploiting its smart contracts to generate mutual contacts graphs
and to manage state changes; integrating secure multi-party
21hyperledger.org
computation platforms, such as Enigma [28], in order to pro-
tect privacy of the collaborating parties, while ensuring correct
botnet detection; testing AutoBotCatcher with several botnet
examples; designing and implementing a trust management
module between agents and block generators, in order to make
AutoBotCatcher resilient against insider threats. We also plan
to extend the current botnet detection model with methods
making use of statistical network traffic features.
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